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If present-day dissidents are to 
reclaim the belief that values are best 
conceived empirically, they should 
begin by considering the imposition 
controversy as a possible dispute over 
the means to be used in schooling. 
The politics 
of values 
by P.L. Smith 
The Ohio State University 
The period of the 1930s was one of extreme tur· 
bulence In American life. Capitalism seemed to be Im· 
potent In the face of massive economic collapse. Even 
democracy was being challenged. It looked to many as If 
personal freedom were incompatible with the demands of 
equality. The realities of the twentieth century were forc-
ing the American tradition of liberty to give way to group 
conceptions of human rights and responsibilities. Matters 
appeared even worse with the loss of faith in reform. The 
1920s had shown the futility of the earlier progressive 
movement and revealed liberalism as an ally of the status 
quo. For those W'ho rejected the established order and 
wished to hasten Its passing, radical action was the only 
acceptable response.• 
Such was the atmosphere in which the founders of 
progressive education were forced to confront a long· 
standing anomaly in their thought. Can virtue be taught, or 
must It somehow be imposed? Progressive educational 
thinkers were never quite clear or consistent In trying to 
answer this question. On the one hand, they recognized 
that values were important and that education must foster 
the good, but, on the other hand, they did not think that It 
was ever wise to force others to accept a particular value 
orientation. 
The Normative Thrust of Progressive Education 
More precisely, the founders of progressive 
education revered democracy as a way of life and saw 
deliberate education as the most effective means f0< trans-
mitting democratic values in an urban industrial society. 
When asked why they so revered democracy as a way of 
life, progressive thinkers had a ready answer. They 
believed that It supplied the necessary and sufficient con · 
ditions for scientific intelligence, or, put In negative terms, 
for non.formalist thinking. And what was the value of 
non·formallst thinking? Progressives believed It was two· 
fold, both Instrumental and intrinsic. It was Instrumental 
In solving practical problems and thereby contributing to 
human survival. It was intrinsic In contributing to human 
welfare and improving the quality of Ille. This belief in the 
inherent value of scientific intel ligence is rarely un-
derstood or appreciated by the critics of progressive 
education. But those who conceived the movement were 
convinced that the ultimate value In non-formalist thinking 
and, thus, in democracy i tself, as a way of life, was found 
in the fact that it created and developed the capacities to 
think and to experience human emotions. Without these 
capacities human beings are essentially the same as other 
living things. But with them, they are unique; they possess 
the necessary tools for deliberately converting the hostile 
forces of nature lo human advantage. And of even greater 
significance, these powers of mind have intrinsic value 
because they provide the source of human culture and the 
foundations of human dignlly. Progressive thinkers were 
humanists by Inclination and naturalists by philosophy. 
Given their convictions and their belief that the realization 
of human mental potential was tied to democratic living by 
empirical necessity, it is easy to understand the normative 
thrust of progressive education. 
However, acoompanying this thrust was abhor-
rence o_f indoctrination. Regardless of motivation, 
progressive thinkers eschewed all forms of imposition. 
Here, too, they had a reason. Indoctrination or imposition 
was seen as contrary to democracy. In so being it stifled 
the growth of scientific intelligence. And this, in turn, had 
the dual effect of decreasing the chances of survival and 
detracting from the quality of life. By itself, the rejection 
of indoctrination or imposition In the educational en· 
terprise of schooling may not seem Inco mpatible with the 
acceptance of a normative thrust in schooling. But there 
was a kicker in this mix. 
Progressive educational thinkers rejected the 
Aristotelian idea of development from within. They were 
unanimous in the belief that the cultivation of human 
nature was not enough. On the progressive view human 
nature Is virtually created by natural forces; and If it Is to 
be created intelligently, it must be understood and con-
trolled by the only source of l ntelligen~ there Is, man 
himself. But ii there is no guarantee, if, Indeed, it is 
unlikely that human beings will develop in desirable ways 
without human control of the process of development; 
and ii the individual or individuals being educated cannot 
be expected to possess the capacities to understand or 
control this process, at least at the start, as virtually 
everyone, including progressive thinkers, will admit, how 
in the world can indoctrination or Imposition be avoided; 
assuming, of course, we should all develop in desirable 
ways? 
Progressive Education In the Limelight 
The failure of progressive education to provide a clear 
and decisive answer to this question represents a serious 
soft-spot in its theoretical posture. So long as 
progressives were on the offensive, attacking the enemy, 
"traditional education" or "formalist educational 
thinking," this soft-spot was hard to detect, and was easy 
to avoid even when recognized. Supporters believed that 
the opposition had a strong Ideological hold on public 
thinking, and that this hold had to be broken before the 
progressive alternative could be completely spelled out. 
But by the 1920s the victory was pretty much won. 
Traditional education was In considerable disrepu te, at 
least theoretically. The immediate effect was to produce 
an intellectual vacuum. Theoretical Issues were simply 
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not seen as Important. Pe ople were intellectu ally free to 
think pretty much what they liked. So tong as they were 
doing something and claimed guidance from some 
rationale, they were effectively left alone to function as 
their own ph ilosophical critics. 
But the press of events soon brought this period to an 
end. And the 1930s were to change the role of the 
progressive tradition in American life. Eyes were no longer 
solely on the opposition. There were real and serious 
problems to be faced, problems that threatened the 
welfare of everyone. If what had been accepted 
theretofore could not provide solutions to these 
problems, people were ready to consider alternatives. The 
mood was at leas t congenial to the practical examination 
of new ideas. Where old ways would not work, new ways 
would be encouraged. What could be better for the type of 
education that was founded on the philosophy of ex· 
perimentallsm? 
Bui with this newfound status came critical 
examination, and, more specifically, self-examination by 
proponents who were at last put on the spot to produce on 
their promise. If their theory of education was to be finally 
accepted, It would have to meet the test, theoretically as 
well as practically, supplied by the realities of the 
depression. Progressive education was finally on the hot 
seat. If it had weaknesses, they would soon be apparent. 
And once apparent they could not be ignored. Progressive 
educa
tional 
thinkers began to polish up their Idea in order 
to present a defensible, unifi ed and effective front to a 
beleaguered and eager, but still demanding, publi c. 
The Official View on Imposition 
The progressives were soon to discover that on the 
question of imposi tion they could not present the type of 
front they desired. Indeed, there arose a controversy that 
revealed the aforementioned soft-spot or anomaly in their 
thinking. There was, i t should be said, an "official 
position" on this Issue, but it could hardly be described as 
acceptable to everyone, or even acceptable to the majority 
of those who shaped opinion in progressive education. 
The official view was the one given by John Dewey 
and supported so admirably by Boyd H. Bode and William 
H. Kilpatrick. Dewey claimed that education need never 
rely on Imposition, even when concerned with li fe's basic 
orientation. He agreed that education must work to trans-
mit the values of democracy, and must thereby foster 
particular dispositions about and towards reality , but he 
insisted, nonetheless, that school learning co uld be 
purely exp erimental. Teachers could avoid indoctrination 
and still be effective. 
Indeed, Indoctrination was seen as an obstacle to ef-
fective school Ing in a democratic society. In a democratic 
society effective schooling provides a democratic orien-
tation to life. Indoctrination either fails to give any orien· 
talion at all, or else brings about an orientation that is 
Inherently undemocratic. Accord ing to this otticlal vi ew, a 
democratic orientation to life can only be provided by 
means that are themselves democratic. Indoctrination 
was believed to be anti-democratic. It was said to hinder 
personal development and destroy the roots of genuine 
community. With this position, I here was virtually no hope 
that schooling under indoctrination could effectively 
foster understanding and acceptance of democratic 
dispositions. 
Why were supporters of this official view so adamant 
in relating educational means to educational ends? The 
FALL, 1978 
answer Is not hard to find, although i t Is amazing how few 
have found it. In the first place, they justified a democratic 
orien tation because it contributed to mental development. 
If In the process o f acquiring a democratic conception of 
reality there was no advancement of mental capacities, as 
there surety would not be under conditions of in-
doctrination, then supporters of the official view would 
have been less enthusiastic about democracy as a way 
of life. But In the second place, and more Import antly, 
they did not believe that a democratic orientation could 
be acquired save through intelligence. Democratic 
d ispositions were said to be founded on intefllgent seff-
selection. While they may contribute to mental develop-
ment, they also presuppose Intelligence in both their un· 
derstanding and acceptance. With a democratic orien· 
tali on we can foster mental growth; but only by reaching a 
certain point In mental development can we acquire a 
democratic orientation. 
Dissenters from the olficial view saw this position as 
paradoxical . But supporters would say that it only appears 
paradoxical if we assume that things exist prior to 
relations, that is, only if we presuppose that intelligence 
and a democratic orientation must exist independently 
and before they are interconnected. But in fact, sup· 
porters would say, this is simply no t so. Both come about 
as a result of an evolutionary process wherein the reality 
and character of each is a result of its transactions wi th 
the other. Here, democratic values and mental capacities 
are assumed to be mutually dependent. Each is a 
necessary condition for the other. As we become more in-
telligent, we are made increasingly aware of democracy as 
a way of life, and as we come lo see democracy as a way o f 
life, we are, by that very fact, made more Intelligent. Each 
is instrumental for the other as well as being an end In It· 
self. A democratic orientation creates an atmosphere 
essential for mental growth. But mental growth must at-
tain a minimum plateau before a democratic orientation 
can be had. 
Dewey was not at all bothered by this apparent con-
flic t. He saw the process of transmitting a democratic 
orientation as necessarily rational. In being rational it 
fosters mental growth. A person Is required to engage in 
practical action, that is, action with a practical purpose, 
and to undergo the consequences of his own behavior. Ex· 
periences are to be more or less unbridled. Imposition or 
Indoctrination o f any sort was seen as a retarding agent. 
Indeed, it was in great measure because of its ref lance on 
the authority o f the teacher that progressives were op-
posed to traditional forms of schooling. Imposi tion and in-
doctrination stifled educational aims. They suppressed 
mental potential and made it Impossible to foster 
democracy as a way of lif e. Progressives holding the of· 
flc lal view were sur ely not going to allow it in their own 
educational scheme. 
The Dissenting View on Imposition 
Other progressives saw i t differently, however. They 
believed the officfal view was mistaken for the same 
reasons liberalism in politics was mistaken. It assumed 
that rational.ity could be a fundamental force in the world, 
that progress was directed by the human mind step by 
step, and that the advancement o f Individual and social 
welfare was gradual and requi red no quantum leap of 
faith. 
Having been thoroughly radicalized by the 1930s, 
progressives who criticized the official view simp ly di d not 
39 
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believe that the recognition of goodness, or what was 
most desirable, was a process that was characterized by 
rationalily. And later in the decade, when they witnessed 
the rise of fascism, they had further confirmation they 
were right. There were limits on rationality in the 
educational enterprise of schooling. Dissenters con· 
eluded from this that the normative thrust of the 
progresslve's educational plan cannol always rely on in· 
telligence. In order lo achieve his aim the progressive 
teacher must sometimes employ tactics that are not them· 
selves congenial to rational student choice. 
Progressives like George S. Counts and John L. 
Childs saw the process of understanding and accepting 
an orientation to life, including a democratic orientation, 
as requiring something like religious insight. And when 
the process represented a change from one orientation to 
another, It required something like religious conversion. 
But ln neither case is intelligence enough by itself. Basic 
democratic truths, like basic truths generally, can only be 
seen through faith, at least in the beginning. 
Take the propositions that define the democratic 
outlook. We say, for example, that people are politically 
equal, that every adult person should have one, but only 
one vote. And we say thi s because, among other things, 
we ~lleve people are equal morally as well, and that the 
political realm is one wherein moral considerations must 
bear. Counts and Childs saw these beliefs as much like 
church dogma. They were true, and every democrat could 
see why they were true, but they could not be demon· 
strated or emplrlcally established as formal arguments or 
scientific judgments, especially to the young or the im· 
mature. To be committed to them morally and emotionally, 
even to understand them intellectually, we must somehow 
transcend rationality. While it may In fact be rational to ac· 
cept a aemocratlc orientation and to reject any orientation 
that Is not, the acquisition of democratic dispositions is a 
complicated extra-rational affair, It Is rarely Itself rational. 
The pedagogical distinction ~tween what we accept 
rat ionally and what is rational to accept is the same as the 
distinction some say is part of the philosophy of science, 
the distinction between the context of discovery and the 
context of verification. Once we see that a proposition is 
true or false, we can set about to formulate a rational 
demonstration. But the recognition or Insight Itself cannot 
be explained In procedural or rational terms. 
The progressives who dissented from the official 
view believed that the problem of education was to get 
students to understand and accept democracy as a way 
of life, and that this was a process of discovery which 
went beyond the bounds of Intelligence. They valued 
rationality and thought it important f0< education to foster 
mental capacities, but they oolieved rationality would be 
valued and mental capacities would be fostered after a 
democratic orientation was established, not before. 
Acquisition of the orientation, they said, did not require 
rationality, and Indeed, was sometimes hindered by an 
overemphasis on reflection and choice. How, then, was 
education to ful fill its normative thrust? Through im· 
position, of course. That is, by a process that recognized 
the complicated extra-rational factors that bear on our 
conceptions of reality and our acceptance of basic values. 
The Controversy as a Bogus Dispute 
Progressive educational thinkers never fully resolved 
this dispute. And it remains something of a soft-spot In 
their theoretical posture. Must it remain a soft-spot 
40 
forever? I, for one, do not think so. In the first place, It 
looks to me as if the dispute were more apparent than real. 
Those who supported and dissented from the official view 
can easily be seen as talking past one another. And if they 
were, they might well have been in agreement and not 
known it. In the second place, the official view rests on a 
naturalistic conception of value, such that the official view 
Is correct if and only If thi s conception is sound. The 
theoretical posture of progressive education can be freed 
from vagueness and contradiction so long as its con· 
caption of value can be presented as a clear and defen-
sible philosophical doctrine. 
On the first point, could we not say that neither party 
to the dispute fully understood the other? Moreover, 
might we not account lor this failure by the fact that the 
contending sides did not fully understand their own 
position, or at least were unable to enunciate it clearly? 
But, of course, we cannot say either of these things 
unless we know what it was each side meant to say. 
From our present vantage point, however, it seems rather 
obvious. However difficult It was to formulate or express 
their ideas in the original situation, it looks now as if one 
side to the dispu te, those holding the dissenting view, 
wished to discuss what we should teach and the other 
side, those who advanced the official position, wanted to 
talk about how we should teach. In most cases the two 
concerns are quite d istinct, although, admittedly, the 
more one pushes at their di fferences the harder it is to tell 
them apart. We all know, for example, that the way we 
teach affects what we teach; our instructional techniques 
have consequences too. By teaching in a certain way, we 
may foster attitudes like tolerance or Intolerance, and 
these are surely legitimate curriculum concerns. 
Unquestionably, It was because progressive 
educational thinkers were reluctant to make a separation 
between curriculum and Instruction that the parties to the 
Imposition controversy continually talked past one 
another and failed to formulate their particular views In a 
clear and decisive manner. In refusing to make the distlnc· 
t ion absolute, they were making a conceptual point that 
was far in advance of lhe thinking in their times. But in 
sometimes acting as If the distinction could never be 
made, they fell victim to an Internal dispute that cost them 
dearly in public support. They were unable to present a 
unified front. Instead of an Intellectual perspective that 
co
ul
be linked to educational practice, people saw the 
extremes of emotional slogans like those they associated 
with political confrontation. 
For this reason It Is unfortunate that progressives 
seem never to admit a distinction between the ideas of 
curriculum and instruction. Although it may always be 
relative, i t is still quite clear within its limits. What we 
teach is one thing, how we teach is quite another. We 
might explain the imposition controversy as an un· 
successful effort to deal with both concerns at once. 
Dewey and other supporters of the official view usually un · 
derstood imposition, and always understood In· 
doctrination, as having to do with how we should teach, 
with instruction or manner of instruction. Dissenters from 
the official view, like Counts and Childs, understood these 
ideas in terms of what we should teach, with curriculum, 
or the aims of education. 
Supporters of the official view would sometimes 
make a distinction between Imposition and indoctrination. 
They would define imposition as the normative thrust of 
education and indoctrination as a strategy, albeit inef· 
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fective, one might emplo y to realize this thrust. Thus, they 
would admit that the former was unavoidable and consider 
it desirable when conceived as a curriculum theory aiming 
to provide a democratic orientation, and they would 
repudiate the latter as a scientifically unsound and 
morally undesirable theory of instruction. As a theory of 
instruction they would say that it cannot transmit a 
democratic orientation, and, furthermore, that it retards 
mental growth. 
On th is analysis Coun ts was right to say that Im· 
position was unavoi dable, but wrong to conclude that the 
choice of what to impose is the only educat ional choice to 
be made. For the conditions o f imposition, or how we Im· 
pose, makes all the d ifference in the world. Whether It be 
restricted or generous, authoritarian or free, whether fac ts 
and values be Instilled dogmatically or explained and sub · 
mltted to the independent judgment of students makes 
the difference between what is and is not taught. ' This is 
not to deny that It is often hard to distinguish in practice 
between what and how we impose, and thus to separate 
the ends of curriculum from the means of instruction. But 
still there is a d istinction at work here. And the occasional 
reluctance of some progressive educational thinkers to 
equate imposition with Indoctrination was a recognition 
this distinction must be made. 
Nonetheless, It Is true that supporters of the official 
view generally saw this distinction as Counts saw It, I.e., 
as a distinction without a difference. Progressives were 
easy to convince that the point at issue lacked practical 
signif cance and was, therefore, unworthy o f in tellec tu al 
support. We can see this reluctance to separate ends from 
means. curriculum from instruction, as a source of con-
fusion in progressive education. And as a source of con -
fusion It can be seen as an explanation of the imposition 
controversy. This is not to say that the parties to the Im-
position controversy were insensit ive or unsympathetic to 
each other's concerns. It is simply to say that the o fficial 
• view on imposition was a view of instruction, and that the 
dissenting view on imposition was a view of curriculum; 
and that the means·ends doctrine subscribed to by bOth 
parties made it dif ficult to specify their respective con-
cerns. The confusion that came about made i t hard for the 
two sides In the dispute to communicate clearly , or, for 
that matter, for each side to fully understand its own 
position. 
We need to be clear here ourselves. This is no t to say 
that there Is anything wrong with the means-ends doctrine 
In progressive thought. Undoubtedly, it is one of the more, 
if not the most, significant philosoph ical Insight of our 
times. But the doctrine only claims that the separation o f 
means and ends is relative and not absolute. It does not 
deny the distinction i tself . Participants in the Imposition 
controversy seemed often to forget the di fference be· 
tween a relative distinction and no distinction at all. But is 
it not obvious from what we know of their work as a whole 
that these progressive educational thinkers held to a 
distinction between curriculum and instruction, albeit a 
relative one? To insist they wanted to abOlish the dlstlnc· 
ti on altogether simply does not make sense. To say, as the 
progressives d id, that decisions o f the one sort affect 
decisions of the other sort, or even that decisions o f the 
one type might entail decisions of the other type, Is not to 
assume that the decisions are one. 
The imposition controversy was by and large a bogus 
dispute. Those who argued for the official view did not 
mean to Imply that teachers sho uld be neutral on critical 
FALL, 1978 
questions of the day. They recognized that neutrality 
would deny the normative thrust o f progressive education. 
Surely no one could show they were ind ifferent towatds 
the inculcation of values, or lacked a commitment to the 
promotion of a democratic orientation through formal 
education. It may well be that they saw a democratic orien· 
talion, like happiness, as best achieved if not directly pur· 
sued. And in this there might have been a genuine dl f· 
ference with their crit ics. Their critics wanted to do the 
good by th e most direct means. They proceeded im· 
med lately to teach democracy and hoped to foster mental 
capacities indirectly as a by-product o f democratic living. 
But with the official view there was a tendency to begin by 
fostering mental capacities and ·then to teach democracy, 
or even to let democracy teach Itsel f as a result of exer. 
cising intell igence. It was as If supporters of the official 
view believed that doing well, or achieving excellence or 
perfection in conduct or In practica l actions was a more 
worthy goal than doing the good, at least as a proximate 
objective. Doing well, or doing a good job, as opposed to 
doing the good, seemed to be held out as a more reliable 
gu ide for achieving moral perfection than that suppl ied by 
the motive to do what was morally right.' But this em-
phasis on mental capacities does not deny the ac-
ceptance of a democratic orientation as a moral ideal. It 
only indicates the strategy adopted by those who ac-
cepted the official position. One Is no less committed to 
democracy as a way of li fe simply because he believes it is 
most likely to become a realit y If pursued by a roundabout 
route. 
Correspondingly, dissen ters from the official view did 
not want to claim that education was merely a process of 
shaping beliefs or conditioning behavior. They accepted 
restric tions on manner of teaching. The normative th rust 
of education must employ moral means. Although they 
emphasized teaching a democratic orientation over the 
development of mental capacit ies, they accepted the lat-
ter as a goal of equal prominence, at least. Their em-
phasis, too, was one o f strategy, not moral priority. They 
simply did not believe that education could realize mental 
potential in a decadent society, and that education for a 
democracy must temporarily precede individual develop-
ment. Bu t they never meant l hls to be interpreted as a lack 
o f respect for personal integrity. Aller all , they accepted 
the means- ends doctrine too. They acknowledged the in· 
trinsic value of mental life, and knew the manner by which 
it was fostered could never be Ignored altogether. And 
they agreed with supporters of the o ffic ial view that in or-
der to be justifi ed , a democratic orientation to life must 
have instrumental as well as Intrinsic value. And, fur-
thermore, they believed that In a just society we must all 
be able to satisfy our spiritual as well as our material 
needs. By maintaining this belief, they recognized that the 
quality of l ife was as Important as Ille Itself . They, as well 
as supporters of the offi cial view, wanted to foster in-
telli gence. And why was intelligence valued? Not simply 
because It provided the mechanism for self-direction and 
control, but because it was a source ol enjoyment as well. 
In the end, bOth sides to the Imposition controversy ac· 
cepted the same educational goal-to free the mind from 
the forces of nature that created it. 
The Commitment to Ethical Naturalism 
There is one last matter to discuss. In many respects 
it represents the most important Issue of all . Undoubtedly, 
i i deserves considerable attention, more than we will give 
41 
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it here. Slill, enough can be said In brief to Illustrate the 
essential point. On Its face. it is simple enough. Even If the 
imposition controversy was more apparent than real, It did 
demonstrate the commitment of progressive educational 
thought to ethical naturalism and to the theory of value 
inherent In ethical naturalism. 
Dewey and the supporters of the offic ial view were 
quite clear on this. They argued that values were objective 
natural properties and that they could only be known 
through the intelligent analysis of experience, that Is, 
through reason and empirical Investigation. This bears on 
education in a most crucial manner. For it Implies literall y 
that students cannot acquire and/or understand a 
democratic orientation to life unless they engage in prac· 
t ical action and rellect on their resultant experiences. 
At times dissenters from the official view did not 
seem to recogni ze this requirement. Where they expressly 
repudiated it, the only explanation can be that they failed 
to recognize, or would not accept, the theory of value 
which underlies ethical naturalism and defines its basic 
tenets. They sometimes, perhaps inadvertently, took a 
subjectlvist's position. They wou ld say, In effect, that 
values have no referen ts at all, that they are a creation of 
the human will or a function of perception. At other times 
they would presuppose the first tenet of ethical 
naturalism, that values are objective natural properties, 
but deny the second, that they can only be known through 
the intelligent analysis of experience. 
In either case, hOwever, imposition is essential, not 
only in regards to curriculum, but In regards to instruction 
as well. Since values are defined as having no source, no 
referents, other than human will, there is no role for in· 
tell igence to play in their deteotlon or justification. They 
are arbitrary, and if the educator wants to transmit them to 
students, he must use the means of imposition. Where 
subjectivity reigns, Intelligence has no place. The 
teaching of subjective reality requires non-rational means 
of instruction. 
Even if subjectivity is denied, even if the first tenet 
which underlies ethical naturalism Is assumed, non· 
rational means of instruction must still be employed so 
long as the second tenet is not also accepted. For even If 
we assume that values are objective natural properties, we 
severely l imit , or even exclude, the role of Intelligence In 
their acquisition if we deny the capacity of the individual 
to know them through practical action and reflection on 
resultant experiences. It is necessary to use imposition as 
the means of education whenever and wherever we wish 
to teach something to someone who, for any reason what· 
soever. cannot grasp or understand what we want to teach 
through the exercise of intelligence. Values that cannot 
be understood through intelligence would be like con · 
cepts, postulates or axioms that the student was not 
mature enough to understand. If they are to be taught, 
they must be imposed by non-rational means and on ly 
later, perhaps, be seen by the student as rational or 
necessary. 
On this point the official view on Imposition, and any 
42 
view implied by it, can only be correct If tile theory of value 
which underlies ethic al naturali sm is a sound 
philosophical doctrine. Otherwise the view supporting Im· 
position as a theory of Instruction as well as a theory of 
curriculum would represent a necessary condition for ef· 
fective teaching. But i i the theory of value which underlies 
ethical naturalism was unsound, it would do more than un· 
dermlne progressive education. It would pretty much 
d iscredit progressive thought generally, because 
progressive thought itself is based on this theory of value. 
Pr
ogressive 
education would be inherently defective 
because progressive educatio nal theory would be Inher-
ently defective. And progressive educational theory 
would be inherently defective becauoo the philosophy on 
wh ich it was based would presuppose a false conception 
of value. On the other hand, If this conception of value was 
sound, progressive education would receive, perhaps, its 
strongest support. 
Suppose we were to look at the imposition con· 
troversy as a d ispute over the means of education. In fact 
it was not, but it could have been. And i f It had been, it 
would have represented a genuine and profound 
d isagreement. The controversy would not have been 
l imited to educational or political di fferences, but would 
have included a philosophical dispute over the ontological 
and epistemological features of values. Whether the of· 
l lc lal view, or any view implied by it, could have won out 
would have been contingent on the merits of pragmatism 
itself. Without being fully aware of It, dissenters from 
the official view issued a chall enge to the whole of the 
progressive movement. During this century ethical 
naturalism has been constantly on the defensive. II 
pr
esent·d y 
dissidents of the progressive tradition are to 
reclaim the belief that values generally, and moral values 
in particular, are best conceived empirically and most 
readily acquired through experience and intelligent ac-
tion, they would be well advised to begin by considering 
the Imposition controversy as a possible dispute over the 
means to be used In schooling. If they can show that 
progressive education brings out the best in peOple 
without relying on imposition, they will reestabl ish, and 
not just reaffirm , the faith of their intellect ual ancestors. 
Footnotes 
1. Richard H. Pelis, Radical Visions and American Dreams. 
New York: Harper and Row, 1973, pp. 1·95. 
2. Israe l Scheffler, The Language of Education. 
Springfield, Illinoi s: Charles C. Thomas Publishing Co., 
1968 printing, p. 99. 
3. This dist inction is, of course, an old one, dating back at 
leas t to the time of Aristotle. But its application and 
force in this context was made apparent to me by my 
friend and colleague John B. Hough; but here again, 
only after considerable effort on his part. Perhaps, the 
same could be said of the distinction between 
curriculum and instruction Itself. 
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